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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we determine that a ruling on a statute of 
limitations issue in a declaratory judgment action had 
preclusive effect despite the fact that other requests for a 
declaration were denied because of unresolved factual 
matters. As a consequence, the District Court erred in 
applying a different limitations period in a related ERISA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* The Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman, United States District Judge for the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
sitting by designation. 
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case and barring the claims of some of the employee 
plaintiffs. We also conclude that the District Court properly 
found that an ERISA plan was in existence and provided 
benefits for employees at the time of a plant shutdown. 
Accordingly, we will reverse in part, and affirm in part. 
 
Plaintiffs are former non-union salaried employees of 
Crucible, Inc. who worked at one of the company's steel 
manufacturing facilities in Pennsylvania that closed in 
1982. Most of the plaintiffs were at the Midland plant, and 
most were terminated that year, with a few remaining in 
their positions until as late as 1986. In 1982, Crucible 
changed its name to Colt Industries Operating Corporation, 
which today is a dormant corporation. We described in 
detail the background facts leading up to this litigation in 
Henglein v. Informal Plan for Shutdown Benefits for Salaried 
Employees, 974 F.2d 391, 395-96 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Henglein 
I"), and need not repeat them here. 
 
The employees first filed suit against the employer in 
August, 1983, presenting a number of claims. Those for 
shutdown benefits were dismissed on appeal because the 
complaint failed to name the proper defendant. Schake v. 
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., No. 85-3381 (3d Cir. May 14, 
1986).2 
 
In September 1986, the employees filed the present 
action ("Henglein") under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 
U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B), against two plans alleged to be 
administered by Colt, an "Informal Plan" and a"Parity 
Plan." The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were entitled to 
shutdown benefits pursuant to an Informal Plan that was 
created by Crucible's 1962 plan, and amended by 1968 and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The closing of the Crucible plants generated an unusual amount of 
appellate litigation. See Schake v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., No. 85- 
3381, (3d Cir. May 14, 1986); Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 789 
F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1986); Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried Ret. 
Plan, 854 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1988); Frank v. Colt Industries, Inc., 910 
F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1990); Henglein I, 974 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1992); Henglein 
v. Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Employees, No. 
93-3219, (3d Cir. Jan. 13, 1994) ("Henglein II"); Henglein v. Informal 
Plan 
for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Employees , No. 94-3074, (3d 
Cir. Sept. 26, 1994) ("Henglein III"). 
 
                                4 
  
1969 documents. In addition, some of the employees 
sought a $400 monthly supplement under the so-called 
Parity Plan. 
 
As described in the complaint, the Informal Plan provided 
plant closing benefits for older, long-time employees who 
had not yet qualified for 30-year pension benefits under the 
company's Formal Plan. These supplemental benefits were 
to be paid monthly until the recipient reached the age when 
Social Security benefits became available. The claim for 
Parity Plan benefits was based on management's alleged 
promise to equalize plant shutdown benefits between union 
and non-union employees. 
 
Rather than answering the employees' complaint, Colt in 
its capacity as administrator of the putative Plans, filed a 
declaratory judgment action seeking rulings that the 
Informal Plan and Parity Plan did not exist, and the 
employees' rights to a pension were governed solely by the 
Formal Plan in effect in 1982. The District Court stayed the 
employees' action and proceeded with the declaratory 
judgment. 
 
In November 1988, the District Court ruled that there 
was no Parity Plan, and that the statute of limitations for 
the employee claims was six years. Colt v. Frenn , No. 86- 
2642 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1988). Colt's counts seeking 
declarations of the non-existence of other benefit plans 
were dismissed because unresolved material issues of fact 
precluded summary judgment. Id. Neither party appealed. 
 
The employees' suit (Henglein) then resumed. After taking 
testimony, the District Court ruled that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction because the employees had failed to 
prove that an Informal Plan existed under ERISA. On 
appeal we reversed and remanded for fact-finding to 
determine whether the alleged Informal Plan straddled the 
enactment of ERISA. We also held that the employees were 
collaterally estopped from raising the Parity Plan matter 
because of the ruling in the Frenn declaratory judgment. 
Henglein I, 974 F.2d at 402. 
 
Extensive District Court proceedings that followed 
resulted in two more appeals to this Court. Henglein II, No. 
93-3219 (3d Cir. Jan. 13, 1994); Henglein III , No. 94-3074 
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(3d Cir. Sept. 26, 1994). In both instances, we remanded 
for additional consideration by the trial court. During the 
pendency of the third appeal, the district judge who had 
presided over the litigation retired; on remand another 
judge was assigned the case. Following a bench trial, the 
second judge filed extensive findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and entered the judgment now on 
appeal. We will summarize the District Court's findings. 
 
Evidence of the employer's representations and conduct 
extended from before the 1975 effective date of ERISA up 
until the time the claims arose in 1982. In 1968 Crucible 
adopted an "Early Severance and Disability Program." This 
document and a memorandum were distributed to the 
employees. The 1968 Plan was amended in 1969 by the 
"Hardship Retirement Guidelines," which, however, was not 
generally distributed to the employees. In 1972, a board of 
directors resolution purported to rescind the 1968 Early 
Severance And Disability Programs. No notice of this action 
was given to the employees. 
 
In 1972, Crucible amended and rewrote its retirement 
plan entitled "Crucible Inc. Retirement Plan for Eligible 
Salaried Employees." It was printed in booklet form and 
circulated to all salaried non-union employees. Various 
amendments were made by the "1975 Salaried Retirement 
Plan," which the employees received in 1976. Those 
booklets failed to contain any statement that the employees' 
benefits were limited to those described therein. 
 
Crucible never issued to its employees in general any 
written notice that the 1968 and 1969 Early Severance and 
Disability Benefit Programs had been rescinded. In a 1973 
memorandum, E. A. March, Group Vice President of 
Crucible, Inc. wrote to division presidents, controllers, 
personnel directors, and the retirement board informing 
them that "there is no `Informal Pension Plan' to which new 
names can be added." When advising the vice president of 
Employee Relations for the Midland plant of this news, 
March directed, "I don't want anyone to talk about it." 
 
Three Crucible vice presidents who served as members of 
the executive committee were never informed about the 
cancellation of plant shutdown compensation for salaried 
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employees. John Vensel, president of Crucible's Alloy 
Division at Midland, Pennsylvania, testified to his belief 
that shutdown benefits for salaried employees were in 
existence in 1982. Vensel also told the employees he 
supervised that the benefits were available. 
 
At various meetings during 1969 through 1982, senior 
members of Crucible management told salaried employees 
that their benefits would always equal or exceed in value 
those extended to union members. The employees believed 
this meant they would receive additional compensation in 
the event of plant shutdown. 
 
In conformance with its factual findings, and following 
this Court's legal analysis in the three appeals, the District 
Court concluded that the Informal Plan for Shutdown 
Benefits for Salaried Employees was a defined benefit 
employee plan at the time of the shutdown in 1982, and 
was governed by the 1968 "Early Severance and Disability 
Benefit Plan" as amended by the 1969 Hardship Benefits 
Program. The Court also observed that the employees met 
the requisite age and service criteria. 
 
However, in considering an issue not raised in any of the 
appeals, the Court concluded that the applicable statute of 
limitations was three years. As a consequence the claims of 
all but six of the 164 plaintiffs were time-barred. 
 
In accordance with the parties' stipulation, the claims of 
the six individuals were referred to the Plan administrator 
for calculation of the benefits due. The Court approved the 
awards to five of the employees, but disagreed with that of 
the sixth employee, E. P. Fahnert, who was granted 
monthly payments to age 65. Reviewing the administrator's 
calculations, the District Court focused on the 1969 Plan's 
use of the term "life income" and modified Mr. Fahnert's 
award, directing that the payments continue for his 
lifetime. 
 
In reviewing the claims to the Parity Plan benefits, the 
District Court reaffirmed the prior dismissal in accordance 
with the directive in Henglein I. 
 
Both parties have raised substantial issues on this 
appeal. The employees challenge the ruling on the three 
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year statute of limitations, contending that the six year 
period set out in Colt v. Frenn controls. They also renew 
their claims for "parity payments" and assert that the Plan 
administrator used an inappropriate basis for determining 
the amounts due the successful plaintiffs. 
 
The Plans defend the three year statute of limitations 
ruling, but in their cross-appeal contend that the District 
Court erred in allowing Fahnert a "double recovery." The 




This case comes to us after a non-jury trial. We review 
the findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, 
Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 52(a), and the conclusions of law de 
novo. Gregoire v. Centennial School Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 
1370 (3d Cir. 1990). The statute of limitations is the 
predominant issue in this case, and we will therefore 
address it first.3 
 
The parties agree that ERISA contains no statute of 
limitations applicable to the controversy at hand, and 
conducted the litigation on the premise that the court 
should look to the most analogous state provision, in this 
case that of Pennsylvania.4 According to the Plans, the 
Wage Payment and Collection Law, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, 
SS 260.1-12, fills the gap. That statute defines wages to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The plaintiffs in Henglein were the same as those who had previously 
been parties in the Schake case, which was filed within the three year 
limitation. Had the Plans been joined in the Schake case after this Court 
had dismissed the relevant counts in that litigation, the relation back 
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) would have eliminated 
the statute of limitations problem. Plaintiffs, however, chose to file 
this 
separate Henglein case more than the three years after the 1982 plant 
closings. 
 
4. We therefore do not discuss the doctrine of laches under the law of 
trusts. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch , 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 
(1989) ("ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. 
. . . In determining the appropriate standards of review for actions under 
S 1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles of trust law."). It appears 
that 
the overwhelming majority of Courts of Appeals apply a statute of 
limitations in claims under ERISA S 502(a)(1)(B). 
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include fringe benefits due under ERISA plans, and 
establishes a three year statute of limitations. Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 43, SS 260.2a, 260.9a. The Plans cite Syed v. 
Hercules Inc., 214 F.3d 155, 159-62 (3d Cir. 2000), Gluck v. 
Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992), and 
Vernau v. Vic's Market, Inc., 896 F.2d 43, 45 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1990), as supporting a three year limitations period for this 
case. The Plans argue that despite its ruling in Frenn, the 
District Court was obliged to apply the shorter statute of 
limitations in the Henglein suit. 
 
As noted earlier, the declaratory judgment action was 
brought by Colt as Plan administrator, against Frenn and 
one other employee, both named as plaintiffs in the then- 
pending Henglein action. The complaint sought a 
declaration that the Informal Plan and the Parity Plan did 
not exist, and, therefore, the Henglein case should be 
dismissed. In response, the employees sought summary 
judgment on the basis that the Informal Plan and Parity 
Plan were in effect in 1982. Both parties to the declaratory 
judgment suit were represented by the same attorneys who 
appeared in the Henglein case. There can be no question 
about privity or identity of issues in the two cases. 
 
As we mentioned previously, the first judge made several 
rulings in the declaratory judgment action. Finding that a 
Parity Plan did not exist, he entered judgment against the 
employees on that claim. Whether the Informal Plan was 
properly terminated in 1972, and whether it existed after 
ERISA was enacted, however, depended upon disputed 
issues of fact. Therefore, the Court denied the cross- 
motions for summary judgment and dismissed the requests 
for declarations on those points. 
 
The district judge then turned to the question of the 
employees' timeliness in filing the Henglein case: "Finally, 
[Colt] contends that the Henglein action is time-barred." 
After some discussion the judge concluded that "the 
accrual of the statute of limitations did not begin until 
1982." Next, he determined that the Pennsylvania six year 
statute of limitations for actions on contracts was 
applicable. "Here, the [employees] initially brought the 
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Henglein suit in 1986. Therefore, the [employees] properly 




Although the Plans did not take an appeal from the Frenn 
declaratory judgment, they contend that the ruling on the 
statute of limitations issue should not be given preclusive 
effect. They correctly identify the standard requirements for 
collateral estoppel, more generally, termed issue preclusion: 
"(1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the 
issue was actually litigated; (3) the previous determination 
was necessary to the decision; and (4) the party being 
precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented 
in the prior action." Raytech Corp. v. White , 54 F.3d 187, 
190 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments S 27 cmt. j (1982); Henglein I , 974 F.2d at 402; 
Temple University v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 
1991); Arab African Int. Bank v. Epstein, 958 F.2d 532, 535 
(3d Cir. 1992); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 121 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 
Preliminarily, we observe that much of the Plans' 
argument rests upon a concept of "finality" that is unduly 
rigid. In Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1980) (per 
curiam), we commented that " `[f]inality' for purposes of 
issue preclusion is a more `pliant' concept than it would be 
in other contexts." Id. at 412 (footnote omitted). We quoted 
approvingly from Judge Friendly's opinion in Lummus Co. v. 
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 
1961): " `Finality' in the context here relevant may mean 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The ruling on the statute of limitations, although quite forthright in 
the memorandum opinion of the District Court, was not repeated in the 
judgment itself. The parties have not raised the issue of non-compliance 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, requiring that judgments be set 
forth on separate documents. We merely note the point to observe that 
better practice would have been to follow the rule. In any event, 
violations of Rule 58 are not jurisdictional and may be waived. Bankers 
Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978) (per curiam); see also Buck 
v. U.S. Digital Communications, Inc., 141 F.3d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(if terms of declaratory relief appear in the opinion, final decision has 
been reached); Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 619-20 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has 
reached such a stage that a court sees no really good 
reason for permitting it to be litigated again." Id. at 412 n.8. 
 
In In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991), we 
made the point clearly: "[u]nlike claim preclusion, the 
effectiveness of issue preclusion, sometimes called collateral 
estoppel, does not require the entry of a judgment, final in 
the sense of being appealable." We also cited section 13 of 
the Second Restatement of Judgments, which states that 
"for purposes of issue preclusion, . . . `final judgment' 
includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another 
action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be 
accorded conclusive effect." Id.; see also Hawksbill Sea 
Turtle v. Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 
474 n.11 (3d Cir. 1997); Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments S 27 cmt. k. 
 
We need not, however, rely on those applications of the 
"finality" factor because here the basis is an even more 




In Henglein I, we observed that the employees did not 
appeal Frenn's unfavorable ruling on the Parity Plan. 974 
F.2d at 402. Because they did not do so, we held that "the 
district court's ruling that a Parity Plan did not exist was a 
final judgment on the merits," and collateral estoppel 
barred further litigation on that issue. Id. 
 
Despite the clear language in Henglein I, the Plans argue 
that they could not have appealed the Frenn judgment 
because the District Court's dismissal of the Informal Plan 
count based on unresolved factual issues was an 
interlocutory order. The Plans say also that they could not 
have appealed because the ruling on the Parity Plan was in 
their favor. 
 
The Plans' arguments fail to appreciate the unique nature 
of a declaratory judgment action. In a case of actual 
controversy, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a 
court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of 
any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or 
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not further relief is or could be sought. Any such 
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final 
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such." 28 
U.S.C. S 2201. 
 
Once a judgment disposing of all issues on which the 
parties sought a declaration is entered by a court, the case 
is ripe for appeal. Even if the court decides in its discretion 
that it will not entertain the case in any aspect whatsoever, 
that ruling is subject to appeal. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 
515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995) ("In the declaratory judgment 
context, the normal principle that federal courts should 
adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to 
considerations of practicality and wise judicial 
administration."); see also Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C., 588 F.2d 
895, 900-02 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 
Because it has discretion to decline jurisdiction over a 
declaratory judgment action in its entirety, it follows that a 
court may decide some of the issues raised and refuse to 
rule on others. The maxim that the greater includes the 
lesser applies; if the court may choose to rule on all or none 
of the issues presented, it may decide only those it finds 
appropriate for a declaration. 
 
Once a district court has ruled on all of the issues 
submitted to it, either deciding them or declining to do so, 
the declaratory judgment is complete, final, and appealable. 
Nothing remains for the trial court to do and the case is at 
an end in that forum. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 
229, 233 (1945). 
 
We would not be understood to say, however, that every 
ruling in a declaratory judgment is immediately appealable. 
In Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1985), the 
trial judge entered an order on one phase of a declaratory 
judgment action, but specifically left open significant issues 
relating to damages and other relief. Moreover, he did not 
enter a formal judgment. Id. at 701-02. In those 
circumstances, the Court of Appeals held that the order 
was interlocutory and non-appealable. Id. at 702-04. 
Similarly, in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 
U.S. 737, 742 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that an 
order establishing liability, even if considered as a 
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declaratory judgment, was not final where the trial court 
had not ruled on the injunction and damages that had been 
requested. That, however, is not the situation here where 
the court issued a judgment and a ruling on every issue 
submitted. 
 
The normal civil action differs from the declaratory 
judgment in that courts deciding the latter are not required 
to adjudicate the ultimate dispute between the parties. 
Consequently, the disfavor generally shown to appeals from 
partially-dispositive orders in the usual civil action, see, 
e.g., Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 54(b), is not present once a 
declaratory judgment has been entered. In this sense, some 
"loose ends" in the underlying controversy that would 
negate finality for appellate purposes in most civil actions, 
do not have that effect in the declaratory judgment setting. 
See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 33 cmts. b, 
e (noting that if declaratory judgment is valid and final, it 
is conclusive with respect to matters declared). 
 
In Frenn, the District Court could have chosen to decide 
all of the issues, including resolution of the contested 
factual issues on the existence of the Informal Plan. It is 
understandable that the Court did not do so, more than 
likely believing that the disputed factual matters were at 
the heart of the Henglein case and would be better resolved 
in that litigation. 
 
The Plans' arguments dance nimbly around the fact that 
the determination of the statute of limitations was adverse 
to them, and was independent of the ruling on the 
unresolved factual disputes. If, in the main Henglein case, 
the Plans had moved for summary judgment alleging non- 
existence of the Informal Plan, an order denying the motion 
because of the presence of factual disagreement would have 
been interlocutory and non-appealable order. But since the 
Plans chose to use the declaratory judgment vehicle, they 
are bound by its differing characteristics as to finality.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The fact that a declaratory judgment may be used by a party to, in 
effect, make an end run around the non-appealability of otherwise 
interlocutory orders in existing litigation may be a factor counseling a 
district court to decline to entertain such a case. See James W. Moore, 
 




Generally, to have preclusive effect, the challenged ruling 
must be necessary to the prior judgment. Multiple issues 
are frequently presented in declaratory judgment actions, 
however, and on appeal all of those decided lie within the 
scope of review. The Plans, nonetheless, contend that the 
statute of limitations decision was entirely irrelevant and 
unnecessary to the ruling on the Informal Plan because 
"some plaintiffs had filed timely claims even under the 
three year statute." 
 
The fact that the 158 employees would have been barred 
by a shorter period demonstrates that the limitations 
question was a substantial one for both parties. In addition, 
the issue was separable from the others presented, and 
potentially dispositive. Therefore, the decision to resolve the 
question in the declaratory judgment was appropriate. It 
does not matter if the limitations period was irrelevant in 
part to some other phases of the case. 
 
The necessity principle has diminished importance in the 
declaratory judgment setting. Wright, Miller and Cooper 
make the reasoning for this clear: 
 
       "Multiple findings also may figure in declaratory 
       judgment actions. Since the very purpose of 
       declaratory relief is to achieve a final and reliable 
       determination of legal issues, there should be no 
       quibbling about the necessity principle. Every issue 
       that the parties have litigated and that the court has 
       undertaken to resolve is necessary to the judgment, 
       and should be precluded." 
 
18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 
S 4421 (1981). 
 
In this case, each individual ruling on the multiple issues 
presented was subject to appeal and preclusive effect. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12 Moore's Federal Practice S 57.42[3] n.36 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 
2001) (piecemeal litigation not favored). We are not called upon to decide 
whether the District Court should have refused to decide the declaratory 
judgment action in view of the pending Henglein  case in the same court 
raising the same issues. 
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Because the Plans were free to appeal the ruling on the six 
year statute of limitations, and having failed to do so, they 
are bound by it, and precluded from attempting to secure 
a more favorable ruling at this late date. 
 
C. Actually Litigated 
 
The Plans' final objection -- that the issue was not 
actually litigated -- is belied by the District Court's specific 
statement in its Memorandum Opinion, "[f]inally [Colt] 
contends that the Henglein action is time-barred . . . ." The 
opinion then discussed both the question of when the 
cause of action accrued and the choice of the most 
analogous state limitation period. We have no doubt that 
the statute of limitations was contested and was done so at 
the instance of Colt as administrator of the Plans. 
 
D. Unmixed Question of Law 
 
As a final matter, we address briefly an exception to 
normal application of issue preclusion called the"unmixed 
question of law" reservation, articulated in United States v. 
Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924). There, the Court wrote 
that res judicata "does not apply to unmixed questions of 
law." Id.; see Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 28(2). 
 
This exception has been discussed by courts, but none 
has yet delineated its boundaries very well. United States v. 
Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 170 (1984). Significantly, 
the Supreme Court has "had no trouble finding[the 
exception] inapplicable [where there is] close alignment in 
both time and subject matter" between the two cases. Id. 
 
Because the declaratory judgment addressed the same 
facts and claims between the same parties, there was 
precise alignment between the decision in Frenn  and the 
pending Henglein case. To recognize an exception in these 
circumstances would eviscerate the doctrine of issue 
preclusion. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the holding in Frenn 
precluded the Henglein parties from relitigating the six year 
statute of limitations. Consequently, the second judge erred 
in subsequently holding that the employees' claims in 
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Because the District Court concluded that a three year 
period applied, it had no occasion to address the question 
of whether a group of employees who joined the suit after 
1988 were barred by the six year statute of limitations.7 The 
arguments as to these employees are the same, however, as 
were considered by the Court with respect to application of 
the three year limitation: that the statute of limitations was 
tolled, and that the application of the "continuing violation" 
theory would permit recovery. See Meagher v. International 
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 
856 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 
In its general discussion of the statute of limitations 
issue, the District Court concluded that there had been no 
tolling because at the time the employees were terminated, 
they were advised that they would not receive shutdown 
benefits. According to the Court, the statute of limitations 
began to run at the time of that notice. See Adamson v. 
Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 
The employees also contended that the Plans were guilty 
of a continuing violation that extended the limitations 
period, but the Court concluded that that theory was not 
applicable. 
 
The employees asserted that the Plans had an obligation 
to provide benefits through a series of monthly payments. 
In effect, such obligations are similar to installment 
agreements, or as some courts have termed them, 
"continuing contracts." An agreement to provide support for 
life may be termed a continuing contract, and so may be an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Our review of the District Court's record discloses that the employees 
in this category are Ronald A. Montgomery, Michael Druga, William 
Hyams, David A. Nobers, Patrick F. McNichol, Alexander Urames, Henry 
B. Van Fossen, Ezra E. Vest, and Sylvester Vranes. 
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insurance policy to pay a monthly sum of money during a 
period of disability.8 
 
The recurring question with such agreements is whether 
failure to pay each installment establishes a separate cause 
of action on each occasion a payment is withheld, or 
whether only one cause of action accrues for breach of the 
contract. Corbin on Contracts devotes substantial 
discussion to the subject and suggests simply that much 
depends on the circumstances. The treatise pithily 
comments, " `[a]ccrual of the cause of action' has not one 
eternal and exclusively correct meaning, ordained by God 
or by the legislature. There is no `infallible logic' that 
compels one application rather than another." 4 Arthur L. 
Corbin, On Contracts S 989, at 969 (1951). 
 
In Vernau, this Court considered whether the statute of 
limitations barred a non-fiduciary claim for past due 
employer contributions to a pension fund. We concluded 
there was no tolling because plaintiffs had not been 
reasonably diligent. 896 F.2d at 45-47. The question of 
accrual in Vernau was raised only in connection with the 
tolling argument, but we noted that even if each 
delinquency gave rise to a separate claim, the plaintiffs 
were on "inquiry notice" that the terms of the plan had 
been breached. Id. at 46-47. 
 
Two years after Vernau, we had occasion to again 
consider the proper statute of limitations in a section 
502(a)(1)(B) ERISA claim. In Gluck, we noted that differing 
factual situations require consideration of varying periods, 
and that the controlling limitations period in Vernau should 
not be "rotely" applied. Gluck, 960 F.2d 1179-82. As an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As we observed in Henglein I, the definition at 29 U.S.C. S 1002(1) 
does not point to state contract law to determine whether a plan existed 
at the time ERISA was enacted. 974 F.2d at 398. There is no 
inconsistency, however, once a plan is established in analogizing to 
contract law to determine whether a plaintiff may"recover benefits due 
to him under the terms of his plan . . . ." 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B); see 
Tester v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 228 F.3d 372, 375 (4th Cir. 
2000) ("In reviewing the terms of an ERISA plan, we are mindful that 
ERISA plans are contractual documents, and established principles of 
contract and trust law govern their interpretation."). 
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example, we commented on the incongruity of classifying 
future benefits as "wages" under the Pennsylvania Wage 
Payment and Collection Law, "because it provides no period 
of repose to an employer." Id. at 1181. A current claim for 
an ERISA violation affecting the retirement benefit of a 
hypothetical twenty year-old employee thus might accrue at 
age 65. Id. The opinion stated, "we are unwilling to open 
the door to a 48-year limitations period." Id . 
 
Although neither of these cases squarely addressed the 
continuing violation theory, both pointed to problems 
inherent in such an approach. In the circumstances here, 
where there was an outright repudiation at the time the 
employees' services were terminated, it is reasonable to 
expect that the statute of limitations began to run at that 
point.9 We conclude that the District Court correctly 
rejected the tolling and continuing violation theories. 
 
Other facts not revealed by the record before us, however, 
might be relevant in the late-comers' claims. The parties 
have not advised us of circumstances that may have 
affected timeliness of those claims. Moreover, because the 
District Court ruled that the three year limitation applied, 
it had no occasion to consider the status of the employees 
who joined the Henglein litigation after the six year period. 
We, therefore, must remand this particular matter to the 




The language of the 1968 Early Severance Plan 
incorporated by reference the administrative provisions 
found in the text of the 1957 Restated Employee's 
Retirement Plan. Both documents refer to an entity called 
the "Retirement Board," which was directed to calculate 
benefits due. Based on that finding, the District Court 
instructed the Board to interpret the provisions of the Plans 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. A similar result would obtain under trust law. See Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts S 219(2) (1959) ("The beneficiary is not barred merely 
by lapse of time from enforcing the trust, but if the trustee repudiates 
the trust to the knowledge of the beneficiary, the beneficiary may be 
barred by laches from enforcing the trust."). 
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in light of all the circumstances and such other evidence of 
the intention of the sponsor as was not inadmissable. 
 
The employees do not object to the general standard set 
by the Court, but do challenge the findings that the 
applicable formulas were those found in the 1957 Plan. 
According to the employees, the Court should have looked 
to the Formal Plan in existence in 1982, which was more 
favorable to them. 
 
The employees did not raise this issue in the District 
Court and, therefore, we need not consider it now. But we 
do observe that the 1968 and 1969 documents did not 
provide for incorporation of plan provisions that might exist 
at some future time. 
 
Although the employees contend that the benefits due 
should take account of the inflation that occurred between 
1972 and 1982, the District Court correctly pointed out 
that there was no basis in the plan provisions for such an 
adjustment. The courts are not at liberty to rewrite the 
terms of an ERISA plan. Ryan v. Federal Express Corp., 78 
F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
We conclude that the District Court properly approved 
the calculations by the Retirement Board based on the 
references to the 1957 Plan and we will affirm the awards 
granted to five of the employees. We do not, however, 




In reviewing the claim of E. P. Fahnert, the District Court 
rejected the retirement board's calculation. Because he had 
not reached the eligibility age, Mr. Fahnert was not eligible 
for early retirement under the 1957 Plan. Therefore, using 
the terms of the 1969 Severance Plan, the Board calculated 
his claim as a specified reduction of the normal monthly 
retirement benefit, to be paid from the time of the plant 
shutdown until he reached the age of 65.10  At that point he 
would be eligible for 100 percent of the normal retirement 
benefit and the severance benefit would cease. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Specifically, benefits began the fourth month after shutdown and 
continued until the 3rd month following his 65th birthday. 
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The District Court noted that the 1969 Plan provided for 
a "life income starting immediately and actuarily reduced 
under the Restated [1957] Plan." Finding no ambiguity, the 
Court directed that Mr. Fahnert receive the severance 
benefits for the remainder of his life in addition to a 
pension under the Formal Plan. The net result would be 
that Mr. Fahnert would receive 100 percent of the normal 
pension at age 65, plus the actuarily reduced severance 
benefit. 
 
The District Court's interpretation is inconsistent with 
the provisions of the plan documents when read as a whole. 
The 1969 Plan refers in several instances to the Restated 
Formal Plan of 1957, and it is apparent that the benefits 
under the two plans are to be coordinated. 
 
In the event of plant shutdown, the 1969 Plan granted a 
beneficiary the right to an immediate actuarily reduced 
pension based on what he would have received at age 65. 
The Plan appendix sets out the amounts applicable for 
various age and service categories and further provides that 
a portion of early retirement pay is to be paid through the 
1957 Restated Plan and part by the 1969 Plan. 
 
The appendix explains that the percentages were 
calculated so that the employees would receive "exactly the 
same income" under the 1969 Plan that they would receive 
under the new vesting provisions. "[N]o additional value" 
was thus provided. "The only thing which the Guidelines 
provide for the employees in this portion of the table is a 
right to receive immediately an income which is the 
actuarial equivalent of the income which they would 
otherwise receive only at age 65." 
 
Reduced to its simplest terms, the 1969 Plan provides 
that in the event of plant shutdown, a person in Mr. 
Fahnert's position would immediately receive a reduced 
pension until reaching the age of sixty-five, at which time 
the full permanent pension would commence. In Mr. 
Fahnert's case, the reduced pension was $396.89, which 
was 92.3 percent of his normal age sixty-five pension of 
$430 per month. Because he was not eligible for early 
retirement under the 1957 Restated Plan, none of those 
benefits could come from that source. 
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We conclude that, read in its entirety, the 1969 Plan's 
provision for a "life income" incorporates the interim 
payments followed by the normal retirement payments 
commencing at age sixty-five for the lifetime of the 
employee. That being so, the District Court's award of the 
supplemental benefits for life was not supported by the 
1969 Plan's provisions. Accordingly, the Court's order in 
favor of Fahnert will be modified to reinstate the retirement 
Board's award in the amount of $53,183, representing the 
total amount of the severance pension he would have 





In their brief, the employees devote considerable 
discussion to their alleged rights to supplemental payments 
under the so-called "Parity Plan." But that claim was 
rejected in Frenn and just as the employees are entitled to 
invoke issue preclusion on the statute of limitations count, 
so are they bound by the declaratory judgment on the 
Parity Plan claim. We made that point clear in Henglein I, 
directing that "[o]n remand the district court should 
dismiss the Parity Plan claim on the merits." 974 F.2d at 





After a lengthy trial, and following the approach used in 
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982), as 
we directed in Henglein I, Henglein II , and Henglein III, the 
District Court determined that the 1968 and 1969 
Hardship Plans were in existence in 1982. When the plant 
shutdown occurred thereafter, the non-union salaried 
employees became entitled to benefits under those 
arrangements. 
 
The Plans again repeat their arguments that the Crucible 
severance benefits were abolished before ERISA came into 
existence. These contentions, however, simply reiterate the 
points unsuccessfully advanced in Henglein I, Henglein II, 
and Henglein III. 
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The Plans' position has been effectively undermined by 
the comprehensive findings of fact by the District Court 
which are supported by the record. They establish that 
Crucible established a benefits plan in 1968 which it 
published and distributed to its employees. In the following 
year that Plan was amended, but that fact was deliberately 
not made known to the employees. Similarly, in 1972, the 
Board of Directors purported to abolish the Informal Plan 
but concealed that action from the employees. 
 
Despite these surreptitious attempts to revise and revoke 
the benefits plans, company executives continued their oral 
representations that benefits were available for the 
employees. Indeed, in recruiting union workers to accept 
salaried positions, superintendents consistently promised 
that benefits would equal or exceed those established by 
collective bargaining agreements. 
 
In its publication of Formal Plans in 1972 and 1976, the 
Company did not state that those booklets described all of 
the benefits available. To the contrary, company executives 
in the years following told the employees that shutdown 
benefits not mentioned in those publications were available. 
We find no error in the District Court's conclusion that a 




The case will be remanded so that the District Court may 
award benefits due for those employees who qualify under 
the six year statute of limitations. The District Court's order 
of August 23, 2000 establishing benefits for Fahnert will be 
modified and the Retirement Board's calculation of $53,183 
plus interest will be reinstated. The Court will also 
determine whether any of the employees who joined the 
litigation at a later stage are entitled to recover, and if so 
refer the claims to the plan administrator for appropriate 
computations. In all other respects, the judgment of the 
District Court will be affirmed. 
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